

Analysis. Answers. Action.

National Landscape: COOP, COVID-19 and NBS

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Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in Newborns and Children

Overview - Continuity of Operations in NBS

- Background
- Challenges
- COVID-19 impact
- COOP Resources
- State perspectives
- Moving forward



Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)

The COOP for a newborn screening program and its public health laboratories should have two basic features:

- 1) Provide a comprehensive, pre-identified
- list of all core testing, support activities (including reporting), and supplies that must be maintained if the laboratory or birthing facility experiences a partial or complete operational disruption.
- 2) Provide a prearranged plan of action to ensure that all core activities are continued without delay.



Emergency

 An "emergency" in the context of NBS includes more than disaster conditions.

• An "emergency" in the context of NBS is <u>ANYTHING</u> that prevents timely identification of and/or adequate interventions for babies born with any of the disorders included in the NBS panel.



2005: Iowa provided emergency newborn screening for the State of Louisiana in the wake of Hurricane Katrina Timeline

- Aug 29, 2005 (Monday): Katrina makes landfall
- Aug 30: New Orleans floods when levees breached
- Aug 31: LA PHL acknowledges need
- Sep 1: EMAC by LA, IA responds
- Sep 2: Demonstrate IA web NBS Info System Labor Day Weekend
- Sep 6: IA selected, finalize details
- Sep 7: LA sends first batch of specimens
- Sep 8: IA sample load triples

Where are the Gaps?

- Day to day operations
 - Specimen transport
 - Facility list
 - Missing information
 - Rejected specimens
 - Result reporting
 - Residual specimens
 - Follow-up contacts

- Differences in mandated disorders
- Differences in testing methodology
- Policies impacting test result
 - Transfusion
 - Age at collection
- How do you rapidly increase throughput?

How is the Agreement to be Activated?

- The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
 - EMAC, a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure for interstate mutual aid.
 - Through EMAC, a disaster-impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement.
 - Agreement activated in one day.

Lessons Learned

- It can be done
- Essential to have clear understanding of purpose and objectives
- Capacity does exist within NBS community
- EMAC provides essential structure for rapid state to state emergency agreements for NBS [not just for major catastrophe]
- Great partners, in particular PerkinElmer

Planning vs Spontaneous

- Every emergency will have its own fingerprint.
- Every emergency will require some degree of adaptive creativity
- Although our planning, of necessity, was compressed to a couple days, it was essential.
- There is now the opportunity to establish planned procedures for reliable execution for future emergencies.

2012: New Jersey NBS Faces Hurricane Sandy Preparedness, Luck, and Serendipity















Slides courtesy of Scott Shone






October 25 - 29









Slides courtesy of Scott Shone





October 29

- UPS delivered ONLY to NBS Laboratory
- Wrapped up Saturday specimens
- 19 staff
- Began to plan alternate specimen delivery options



Slides
courtesy of
Scott Shone






October 30











October 30



- Use of NJSP for NBS specimen transport approved
- Transport specimens to regional MCCs by 2p
- Message communicated through NJHA
- NJSP transport specimens to laboratory at 4p
- 7 NBS Staff



Slides courtesy of Scott Shone





Rest of the Week

October 31

- 32 NBS Lab staff
- 2 Follow-up Staff
- 2 Medical Directors
- Lab took over communication
- USPS

November 1

- Resumed UPS except for 14 hospitals
- Used courier rather than NJSP

November 2

- Only 2 hospitals remained affected
- "Normalcy" returned to lab

Slides courtesy of Scott Shone





Epilogue: After Action Report

Hurricane Sandy

Now Jersey Department of Houlth

...by the Numbers


- 2 The number of hospitals evacuated
- 5 Number of state shelters opened
- 11 The number of long-term care facilities evacuated
- 39 The number of acute care hospitals that lost power
- 60 Number of DOH staff who worked in Health Command Center and the Regional Operations and Intelligence Center
- 73 The number of conference calls hosted by DOH with partners
- 74 The number of assisted living facilities that lost power
- 100 Number of EMS Task Force units activated
- 127 Number of shelters at height of the storm
- Number of out-of-state ambulance units, sent from 5 states, that assisted during the storm
- 137 The number of health care facilities that lost power
- 885 The number of email addresses that received Hippocrates updates
- 1,746 The number of health care facility residents evacuated
- **7,005** Number of people in shelters at the height of the storm
- **84,113** The number of Hippocrates email notifications sent
- 2.7 million Number of households that lost power at the height of the storm

- Communication
 - One phone number
 - NJHA, Program, Agency, Vendors
 - Hospital contact list
 - Cell phone/email
- Saturday before
- 7 staff on Tuesday
- MCC/NJSP
- Follow-up
 - Power
 - Supplies
 - Remote access
 - Workload
- Capital Post Office
- Family needs
- Essential employee needs






Newborn Screening System




NBS System Processes



- Fielded from November 2 24, 2020
- Sent to all state NBS programs as well as DC, Puerto Rico and Guam (53 programs total)
- Allowed multiple responses per state to capture laboratory, follow-up and other perspectives
- 34 programs responded:
 - 11 states submitted response from laboratory AND follow-up
 - 23 states submitted response from laboratory OR follow-up



Q1: transport and/or courier challenges (n = 43)






20

"Some submitters had physical changes related to COVID-19 response that caused them to dry the blood specimens in new locations. We know of some specimens that were *misplaced* in their new drying system and were *delayed in being sent to our lab.*"

"Loss of personnel by the courier therefore delayed delivery, slow learning curves as new employees adjust to the route, lost specimens, and when specimens are found they are *months old* so are unsatisfactory."

Q2: staffing challenges (n = 45)



Q2: "other" staffing challenges













Q7: reagent/supply shortages (n = 38)












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Differences in priorities...

"I am completing this survey on behalf of our NBS Long-Term Follow-Up program, which is not considered a priority program within NBS unlike the laboratory and short-term follow-up program. Nearly 90% of our long-term follow-up team has been reassigned to COVID duties. Currently, about half of our team is reassigned 90-100% of their FTE to COVID, the other half of our team is reassigned 40-50% of their FTE. We continue to advocate with leadership and be involved in COOP planning, but it is difficult to negotiate and change our priority level in the middle of the pandemic response."

Q9: methods to ensure that NBS is a priority (n = 45)



APHL"

26

APHL Services/Resources

- Hot Topics Webinars
- Committee/Subcommittee/Workgroup expert engagement
- Individual, focused outreach
- Website for resource compilation
- Listserv for real-time information sharing





Case Definitions Quality Indicators

Resources

Disorders

Quality Improvement Practices

Data Visualizations



Save



the NewSTEPs inbox.



Share







It should be noted that resources provided are from state NBS programs and partner organizations, and are not necessarily national recommendations.

At APHL and NewSTEPs, we understand that many of our public health members are engaged in the COVID-19 response. We thank you and commend you for your work in ensuring that essential operations continue, and newborns get screened and treated during these extraordinary times. We are committed to serving the NBS community's needs, and as such, are working to compile resources and guidance regarding the NBS COVID-19 response. If you have additional challenges and/ or best practices and ways to address challenges, please email



Practices and Resources:

- Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP)
- Courier
- Second or repeat screens
- Disorder specific
- Education and outreach
- Telehealth
- APHL/ NewSTEPs/ other
- · Biosafety of specimens
- Supply shortages

Updated daily
Community (member) developed
Resources and guidance
Not necessarily national recommendations

Existing COOP resources and guidance

- Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
- State specific Health Alert Networks
 - Each state has a HAN which may have a prescribed template which all programs must follow
- All hospitals are required to have COOPs
- Newborn Screening Saves Lives Act
 - Sec. 8. National contingency plan for newborn screening
 - National Newborn Screening Contingency Plan, version 2

